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WHEN THE BORROWER AND THE BANKER ARE
AT ODDS: THE INTERACTION OF JUDGE AND
ARBITRATOR IN TRANS-BORDER FINANCE
WILLIAM W. PARK*

"If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem;

but if you owe a million, it has."
John Maynard Keynes'
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1. INTRODUCTION
Lenders and borrowers traditionally have gone before
judges rather than arbitrators to resolve controversies arising out
of international loan agreements. Arbitration has been relatively
rare, even ill-favored, in financial dispute resolution. Except
© 1991 William W. Park.
* Professor of Law, Boston University; Director, Morin Center for Banking Law
Studies; Counsel, Ropes & Gray, Boston. Yale, B.A.; Columbia, J.D.; Cambridge, LL.M.
Thanks are due to my research assistant Diana Helweg.
1. Down Communism's Sink, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1982, at 11 (paraphrasing
Keynes).
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with respect to performance guarantees 2 and securities,3 arbitrators seldom decide controversies arising out of financial transactions. The disfavored status of arbitration in banking contrasts
sharply with arbitration's position as the preferred adjudicatory
mechanism in trans-border commercial relationships.
The banker's customary hesitation about arbitration should
not be surprising. 4 The financial muscle often exercised by international lenders has led to loan forum-selection clauses granting
exclusive competence to courts of the banker's own jurisdiction.
Hometown justice is always best-at least for the hometown boy
or girl. Moreover, a court proceeding may be quicker and less
expensive than arbitration when nothing significant is in dispute
except the borrower's willingness or ability to make payment on
a promissory note. It would be startling, for example, if an English bank did not prefer to sue a defaulting borrower before an
English judge in London rather than to bring a claim before an
arbitrator in Geneva.
Bankers also resist arbitration clauses because they may
sometimes operate to bar the benefits of the summary procedures available to lenders under many national legal systems.
The droit cambiaire of France, for instance, provides for courtordered payment procedures that simplify the enforcement of
commercial-paper obligations. 5 Moreover, some jurisdictions
2. Courts sometimes read a guarantee to incorporate the principal contract's arbitration clause, so that the guarantor is bound to arbitration. See, e.g., Compania Espanola de
Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966, 969-73 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 U.S.
936 (1976), involving a letter of guarantee for performance of all duties in a charter party
"on the same terms and conditions as contained in the charter party." Id. at 969. Obviously, the bindingness of an arbitration clause in the guarantee itself turns on the language
of the guarantee. Id. at 973. On arbitration and bank guarantees, see generally Chambreuil, Arbitrage internationalet garanties bancaires, 1991 Revue de L'Arbitrage [Rev.
Arb.] 33.
3. On arbitration in securities transactions, see generally D. RoBBINs, SECURITIES
ARBITRATION PROCEDURAL MANUAL (1990); Lowenfels & Bromberg, SecuritiesIndustry

Arbitrations: An Examination and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. Rnv. 755 (1989). Arbitration of
disputes arising out of commodities futures transactions has a status not dissimilar to that
of arbitration in securites transactions.
4. That this paper looks at the loan enforcement process from the lender's perspective
is no accident. After advancing the funds, the banker has a legitimate interest in being
repaid according to the terms of the loan agreement. The borrower's temptation to delay
repayment on occasion may be understandable. But without confidence in the enforceability of loan agreements, banks cannot be expected to extend the credit on which international economic development depends. Indeed, it would be unjustifiable, morally as well as
economically, for a banker to put depositors' funds at risk, even for the most worthy of
projects, without a reasonable assurance of being able to vindicate its right to be repaid.
5. The French law permits a holder of a promissory note to request the Tribunal de
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may consider interim measures of protection (such as pre-award
attachment of assets) as incompatible with arbitration agreements covered by the New York Arbitration Convention-at
least if the parties are silent on the matter in their arbitration
agreement. 6
Finally, bankers tend toward a herd mentality (not always
unjustified) that sometimes leads them to fear the hex effect of
innovation: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Changes in old forms
selecting courts that have worked fairly well in the past, so it
seems, will likely bring bad luck.
Nevertheless, legal counsel in the financial services industry
are increasingly aware that things are no longer so simple, particularly in international transactions. Several considerations
occasionally impel the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a
credit agreement: (i) difficulty in enforcing foreign judgments;
(ii) the "act of state" and sovereign immunity defenses raised by
foreign borrowers; (iii) developing countries' leverage in debt
Commerce to grant an order to pay under expedited procedures. See, eg., CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 641 (Fr.) (procedures for "injonction de payer"). See generally 2 C.
GRAVALDA & J. STOUFFLET, DROrr COMMERCIAL: CHtQUES ET EFFETS DE COMMERCE

(1978). Under American law the "holder in due course" of a negotiable instrument benefits
from presumptions of validity as to matters such as the genuineness of signature. See
U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305, 3-307 (1990).
6. In the United States, the circuits are split. See generally Hoellering, Interim Relief
in Aid of International Commercial Arbitration, 1984 WIs. INT'L L.J. 1. Compare
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d Cir. 1974) (preaward attachment denied) with Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044,
1056 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (pre-award attachment permitted). The emerging trend is toward
permitting interim measures in support of international arbitration. In Teradyne, Inc. v.
Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986), the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an
order freezing $4 million of the defendant's assets pending the outcome of arbitration. The
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have also approved preliminary injunctions in
arbitration cases. See, eg., RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 858 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir.
1988); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1055 (4th
Cir. 1985); Roso-Lino Beverage Distrib. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 127 (2d
Cir. 1984); Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984). On interim measures such as pre-award attachment outside the United States, see generally Buhart, Attachments and Other Interim Court
Remedies in Support of Arbitration, France, 1984 INT'L Bus. LAW. 107; Shenton, Attachments and Other Interim Court Remedies in Support of Arbitration" The English Courts,
1984 INT'L Bus. LAW. 101. In Republique de Guinee et Songuipeche v. Atlantic Trinton, a
French court took the position that an arbitration clause calling for the settlement of a
dispute by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (I.C.S.I.D.)
did not prevent the provisional attachment of three ships found in a French port for
repairs. Judgment of November 18, 1986, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1987 Rev. Arb. 315, 26
I.L.M. 373 (1987). Contrast the Swiss position in Judgment of October 7, 1986, Office des
Poursuites, Geneva, 26 I.L.M. 382 (1987) (ordering the lifting of an arbitration-related
attachment against Guinea).
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rescheduling and project finance; and (iv) the epidemic of
"lender liability" litigation in the United States.7
First, when bankers contemplate court adjudication, they
presume enforceable judgments. But foreign judicial decisions
are not always as easily enforced as domestic ones.8 Sometimes
debtors have assets in jurisdictions that are not party to any
bilateral or multilateral recognition-of-judgment treaty with the
dispute-resolution forum. Arbitral awards, however, will usually benefit from recognition and enforcement in more than
eighty countries under the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention. 9 Therefore, in some cases arbitral awards may be more
enforceable than foreign court judgments.
Second, two peculiarly international defenses are increasingly invoked against enforcement of trans-border loans: sovereign immunity and the act-of-state doctrine. These defenses add
a special dimension to international financial risks that requires
a more nuanced analysis of the costs and benefits in arbitration
of credit disputes. 10 Recent statutory enactments reducing the
sting of both defenses give arbitration a special raison d'etre in
any loan implicating a foreign borrower. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act11 and the United States Arbitration Act12 were
both amended in November 1988 to make arbitration awards
more enforceable than court judgments.' 3 Bank counsel there7. An additional concern in domestic banking, beyond the scope of this paper, was
raised by Professor Dennis Aronowitz. Aronowitz, Massachusetts Banker'sAssociation in
BANK REGULATION, REAL ESTATE AND THE MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMY 9-12 (Mass.
Banker's Ass'n ed. 1990). Professor Aronowitz suggested creating a nonbinding "advisory
process" in the finance industry for reviewing disagreements between banks and examiners.
Id The procedure would be administered by a neutral organization with experience in
mediation, such as the American Arbitration Association. Id
8. For a recent journalistic account of the difficulties that may arise in enforcing a
U.S. judgment abroad, see Schmitt, ClaimantAgainst JapaneseLearns the Wordfor Delay,
Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1990, at BI, col. 5. On the problems involved in enforcing foreign
judgments, see infra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
9. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
10. See infra notes 39-73 and accompanying text.
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11 (1988).
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, 201-208 (1988).
13. These are sometimes referred to as the "LIAMCO Amendments" because the
clarified issues were addressed in a 1980 District of Columbia case entitled Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, (LIAMCO), in which sovereign
immunity and the act-of-state doctrine were raised (the latter successfully, the former not)
as defenses to the enforcement of an oil concession arbitral award against Libya in a dispute
arising out of the nationalization by Libya of American-owned oil concessions. Libyan

1991]

TRANS-BORDER FINANCE

1327

fore can be expected to show greater sophistication in drafting
forum-selection clauses when loans involve sovereign debt or
borrowers in countries that may impose exchange controls.
Third, in some cases, borrowers may give the creditor no
alternative to arbitration other than the courts of the debtor's
country. Arbitration imposes itselffaute de mieux when the size
of a borrower's potential default, paradoxically perhaps,
increases its leverage in rescheduling negotiations to the point
that the lender's own courts are no longer an acceptable option
for the choice-of-forum clause.
Finally, the American epidemic of "lender liability"
actions 14 against banks has led several major lenders to insert
arbitration clauses in credit agreements in the hope of reducing
the risk of excessive jury awards.
This Article will discuss each of these considerations in
turn, and then will examine the impact of the International
Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement on arbitration of transborder loan disputes. From a policy perspective, my modest
conclusion is that the measure of financial arbitration's aggregate consequences-social, political, and economic-will be the
extent to which the arbitral process increases the reliability of
credit arrangements that promote world development. In a
more practical vein, the costs and benefits of arbitration as compared to court litigation will depend on how the relative predictability of judges weighs in against the greater enforceability of
arbitral awards in disputes implicating exchange controls, foreign assets, and sovereign borrowers. The only thing that seems
beyond doubt is that for some time to come arbitration's role in
financial dispute resolution will resist facile analysis.
II.

THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION

Recalcitrant borrowers do not always have assets within the
forum asked to enforce the loan agreement or guarantee. In
such cases, the lender may be better off with an arbitral award
American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-79
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of InternationalDisputes, 23 INT'L LAW. 187, 191-92 (1989).
14. In "lender liability" cases, banks have been held to a duty of "good faith" toward
a borrower seeking more funds or seeking to avoid acceleration of a loan. Controversy
exists both as to whether a "good faith" obligation is an appropriate way to police unfair
lender practices, and whether jury awards against financial institutions are excessive. See
infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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than with a court judgment, assuming that the arbitration clause
will be interpreted to include the controverted default within its
15
scope.
16
Effective procedures for enforcement of foreign judgments
are not always available in the countries where a bank's debtors
have assets. 17 For example, a judgment rendered against a Chinese borrower by a court in New York might have to be satisfied
from the debtor's assets outside the United States. If the lending
bank seeks to enforce the judgment against the borrower's property in China (or in any other country, for that matter), it will
find that there is no reciprocal enforcement-of-judgment treaty
that binds China, or any other country with the United States.
The lender may also find that the law of the asset situs has nothing effectively equivalent to the American enforcement-of-judgment procedures-such as the Uniform Foreign Money
Judgments Recognition Actls--with which its general counsel is
15. See, eg., Judgment of May 11, 1988, Shanghai Intermediate People's Court,
Shanghai, II CL.P., Aug. 22, 1988. In this case, the Chinese courts assumed jurisdiction
over a dispute between a Chinese importer and a Swiss seller (I.R.C.) of rolled steel,
notwithstanding an arbitration clause in the sales contract. The court disregarded the arbitration clause on the basis that the arbitration clause did not cover claims arising out of the
tort of fraud (the cause of action in the case), rather than the contract. The case has been
criticized by commentators as "sophistical." I. at 5.
16. See discussion of Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, infra note 18.
17. On non-American procedures, see SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 967-71
(1984). See generally ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (C. Platto
ed. 1989) (of particular relevance are the essays discussing France, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). For a discussion of arts. 25-32 of the 1987 Swiss statute
on private international law, see generally the commentary by Karrer and Arnold, in P.
KARRER & K. ARNOLD, SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE OF
1987, at 50-56 (1989); compare with Dennis, China, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 36-38 (C. Platto ed. 1989) (discussing Chinese "entrustment"
requirements). On procedures available in Central America, see generally R. CASAD,
CIVIL JUDGEMENT RECOGNITION (1981).
18. 13 U.L.A. 272 (1986). The Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act
(F.M.J.A.) was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1962. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 131-

32 (1962) (F.M.J.A. reprinted at 243-45). Foreign money judgments will be recognized
assuming interalia an impartial tribunal, foreign court jurisdiction over the defendant and
the subject matter, proper notice to the defendant, and an absence of fraud in obtaining the
judgment. F.M.J.A. §§ 2-4, 13 U.L.A. 272 (1986). Under these circumstances the foreign
judgment will not be called in question for error of law or fact by the foreign court. Recognition may be refused to a foreign judgment even when a comparable judgment of an
American sister state would compel recognition under the Constitution's full faith and
credit clause. See id §§ 3-4.
A Supreme Court decision of the last century, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895),
suggested a reciprocity requirement denying preclusive effect to a foreign judgment if the
foreign jurisdiction would not give similar recognition to an American judgment. IdL at
227-28. However, Hilton v. Guyot did not address the issue of whether the reciprocity
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familiar, notwithstanding some obscure academic questions that
may exist at the margins.1 9
Chinese procedure, to take the illustration at hand, makes
enforcement of a foreign judgment difficult by requiring an
explicit "judicial entrustment" of the judgment by a foreign
court to a People's Republic of China tribunal. 20 Nevertheless,
China has adhered to the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention, as have more than eighty other contracting states, including the Soviet Union, most industrialized nations, and many
developing countries2 with which the United States has neither
bilateral nor multilateral enforcement-of-judgment treaties.22
Actors in international business transactions look to the
requirement would bind state courts; on this question see infra note 19. The defense of lack
of reciprocity seems to have been generally discarded. See, eg., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum, 453 F.2d 435, 490 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1017.
19. Since the 1938 decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal
courts whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship are required to apply the rules
of the state in which they sit, absent federal preemption by either treaty or legislation. See
discussion in Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 450-57 (D. Mass.
1966), decided before Massachusetts adopted the F.M.J.A. (Massachusetts rather than federal law applied in diversity action between Swedish bank and Massachusetts residents.
Swedish judgment on guarantee of exporter was not considered conclusive, but only prima
facie evidence of underlying lien; plaintiff bank allowed to recover amount of guarantee.).
It is an open question, at least to me, what rules a federal court should apply if asked
to recognize the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment when jurisdiction is based on a
federal question rather than on diversity of citizenship. For example, assume that a federal
court takes jurisdiction over an action between two foreign persons, one of which is a foreign government invoking a defense of sovereign immunity in resisting enforcement of a
foreign judgment. Federal court jurisdiction would be based on the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, not diversity of citizenship. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1983). Presumably federal rather than state law would apply to
recognition of the foreign judgment. Similar conffict between state and federal rules might
arise if federal law required recognition to a foreign judgment under the act-of-state doctrine when state law, for whatever reason, called for the opposite result. Likewise, an
action before a federal court based on a federal statute may require the court to deny the res
judicata effect of a foreign judgment (e.g., a French court pronouncement on a securities
law issue raised in a dispute about a sale of American securities between two Frenchmen)
when that judgment offends American public policy.
20. See art. 204, Zhongua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao [the Peoples
Republic of China State Council Gazette] no. 6 207 (1982) (discussed in Cheng, Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards in the People'sRepublic of China, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 295,
317 (1986)).
21. See Appendix I.
22. The Bruxelles Convention of 1968 applies among members of the European Economic Community (EEC), but the United States is not a party. See European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial
Matters (hereinafter the Bruxelles Convention), Sept. 27, 1968, 21 O.J. Eur. Com. (No. L
304) 77 (1978), 8 I.L.M. 229; see also A. DASHIWOOD, R. HACON & R. WHITE, A GUIDE
TO THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGEMENTS CONVENTION (1987); Tebbens, Jurisdiction and Enforcement in InternationalContractLaw: Selected Aspects of the Brussels Con-
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Convention to provide a reasonable expectation that arbitration
commitments will be more than mere pieces of paper. The Convention requires respect for an agreement to arbitrate 23 and recognition and enforcement of the resulting awards.24 Subject to a
few limited defenses designed to promote procedural integrity
and basic notions of public order, courts of countries that adhere
to the Convention will recognize and enforce an arbitrator's
award that a recalcitrant borrower make good on its obligation
to pay interest and principal on its loan.
The United States, like many other countries, applies the
Convention to foreign awards only if rendered in the territory of
another contracting state. This reciprocity requirement looks to
the country in which the award is rendered, not the parties'
vention 1968/1978, in INTERNATIONAL -CONTRACTS AND CONFLICTS OF LAWS 124
(1990).
Some uncertainty may exist as to the scope of the Bruxelles Convention with respect
to arbitration. Article 1(4) states that the Bruxelles Convention "shall not apply to...
arbitration." Scholars have debated whether this means that even court proceedings ancillary to arbitration (eg., judgments determining whether an arbitration agreement is valid)
ate excluded from Convention coverage. See, eg., Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Societa Italiana Impianti, [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 548, referring to the European Court of Justice (31
May 1989-No. 320854) the question of whether English courts had jurisdiction to appoint
an arbitrator for a recalcitrant defendant in a London arbitration notwithstanding a prior
action in the matter brought in Italy, thereby implicating Bruxelles Convention art. 21 on
lis alibipendens. The claimant argued for a broad interpretation of the art. 1(4) exclusion
that would permit the English courts to take jurisdiction.
The Lugano Convention contains provisions that parallel those of the Bruxelles Convention. See Lugano Convention, September 16, 1988. The Lugano Convention will enter
into effect shortly for European nations that are not EEC members. Droz, La convention
de Lugano paralleled la convention de Bruxelles, 78 REVUE CRITIQuE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVf- 1 (1989).
23. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. 11(1).
24. Id. art. III. Article III of the New York Convention requires recognition of foreign arbitral awards. The New York Convention generally follows a territorial approach
with respect to awards, looking to the locality of the proceedings, and covering primarily
awards rendered in a country other than the one in which enforcement is sought.
The Convention's scope also extends to awards "not considered as domestic." Id. art.
I(1). One American case-has interpreted "non-domestic" to include an award rendered in
the United States in a dispute between foreign parties relating to a commercial transaction
occurring outside the United States. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932
(2d Cir. 1983), involved a charter party between a Norwegian shipowner and a Swiss company transporting chemicals between the United States, Europe, and the Caribbean. After
an award in favor of the shipowner (Bergesen), enforcement attempts were unsuccessful in
Switzerland. Bergesen then petitioned for "confirmation" of the award in New York under
the three-year period provided by title II of the United States Arbitration Act (covering
New York Convention cases), rather than the one-year period for domestic arbitration.
'After a survey of the purposes and legislative history of the New York Convention, the
court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to give the convention a scope wide
enough to cover the scenario at bar. Id.
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nationalities. 25 The Convention's scope also includes awards
"not considered as domestic" even though rendered within the
enforcing state.2 6
The Convention does not permit a court of a contracting
state to review an award on its merits. Recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused only on the basis of one of the
litany of limited defenses enumerated in article V of the Convention.27 These defenses include five procedural defects in the
integrity of the arbitral process: lack of a valid arbitration agreement; denial of an opportunity to be heard; an excess ofjurisdiction by an arbitrator in deciding matters beyond the scope of the
arbitration submission; procedure contrary to the parties' agreement; and annulment of the award in the country where rendered. Recognition and enforcement may also be refused
because the subject matter of the arbitration is nonarbitrable, or
because the award violates a fundamental public policy of the
enforcing forum. 28
In permitting the refusal of enforcement of awards annulled
where rendered,29 the Convention makes no distinction among
25. Compare with 1961 European Convention on International Arbitration, Apr. 21,
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, which applies to agreements between persons resident in different
contracting states. Id. art. I(1)(a). The United States does not apply the New York Convention to awards or agreements arising out of legal relationships entirely between American citizens, including a company incorporated or having a principal place of business in
the United States. See A. VAN DE BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTMON
OF 1958, at 56-71 (1978). An exception to this rule is made when the underlying transaction involves foreign-situs property or performance of the contract abroad. Id
The Convention's scope with respect to arbitration agreements is ill defined. Id Article HI(3) requires enforcement of arbitration agreements without defining which agreements
fall within its scope. Id The leading scholar on the Convention supports a broad interpretation, including agreements providing for arbitration in a state other than the enforcement
forum, or agreements that are international by their subject matter or by the nationality of
the parties. Id
26. See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932.
27. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V, reprintedin Appendix II. The first
five procedural defects, which must be asserted and proven by the residing party, permit
the court to avoid lending its power to support a fraudulent or unfair arbitration, but are
not intended to permit judicial review of the merits of the dispute. See id. art. V 1(a)-(c).
The final two defenses against recognition of an arbitral award are open to a court on
its own motion, without any proof by the party resisting the award: that the subject matter
is not arbitrable, and that enforcement would violate the forum's "public policy." Id. art.
2(a)-(b).
28. While the first five Convention defenses relate generally to public policy in the
sense that they are safeguards against injustice, the final defense serves as an explicit catchall for the forum's particular substantive public policy.
29. This last defense permits the forum in which enforcement is sought to deny recognition of an award set aside by a court of "the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made." Id art. V(1)(e). The English version of art. V(l) (e) is permissive,
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the various grounds on which the award was set aside, whether
for a matter as serious as arbitrator corruption or as parochial as
failure to state reasons for the award. For better or worse, the
Convention fails to distinguish between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" grounds for annulment. Specific reasons for vacating
awards are neither mandated nor prohibited. The arbitral situs
is free to set aside awards for any reason it sees fit, or none at
all.30 This has led some scholars to suggest that the Convention
be amended to require enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
only when rendered in countries that provide a nonwaivable
right of review of awards for violation of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, fundamental procedural fairness, or international public
31
policy.
An arbitration agreement, of course, is only one variety of
forum-selection clause. Dispute resolution by a court of a neutral country is also an option. But lenders cannot always be certain in advance that a given national court will accept
jurisdiction. Some courts will accept jurisdiction of disputes
between foreign parties without a connection between the dispute and the country of the forum.32 Other courts may not.33
stating that an award "may" be refused recognition and enforcement if set aside under the
law of the country in which it was rendered. The equally authoritative French text, however, is more forceful. The French text of the Convention states: "La reconnaissance et
l'ex6cution de la sentence ne seront refuses ... que si... la sentence.., a &6 annulme ou
suspendue ....
("Recognition and enforcement will not be refused... unless... the
award was annulled or suspended.") Id., 330 U.N.T.S. at 41-43.
30. An annulled award might still be recognized under the enforcement forum's
domestic law. The intricate interplay of national law with the Convention is illustrated by
recent case law of the French Cour de cassation. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 9, 1984, Cour
de cassation, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1985 Rev. Arb. 431 comment B. Goldman, 112 S. Dr. Int'l
(CLUNET) 679 (1985) comment Ph. Kahn. The case involved a commercial agency agreement between a French company and a Turkish agent. An arbitral award rendered in
Austria applying lex mercatoriaquashed by the Vienna appeals court (later reversed by the
Austrian Supreme Court) led to a refusal of exequatur by the Paris Cour d'appel in 1982,
reversed by the cour de cassation, which held that French courts had a duty to determine
whether the award was enforceable under French internal law.
The New York Convention expressly contemplates this possibility in art. VII (1),
which provides that its provisions "shall not... deprive any interested party of any right he
may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by
the law or treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon." New
York Convention, supra note 9, art. VII.
31. See Park, NationalLaw and CommercialJustice: SafeguardingProceduralIntegrity in InternationalArbitration, 63 TUL. L. Rnv. 647, 707 (1989).
32. See THE ATLANTIC STAR, 1 Q.B. 364, 382 (1973). New York General Obligation Law § 5-1402, was enacted in 1984 to permit New York courts to take jurisdiction of
disputes of at least $1 million between foreign corporations that have elected to have New
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However, no such limits are likely to arise if the parties refer to
arbitration.
In summary, a lender that anticipates having to bring an
action to enforce a foreign judgment will need to consider
whether the judgment will fall within the provisions of either a
recognition-and-enforcement treaty or a national statute on recognition of foreign judgments. The United States is not a party
to any bilateral recognition-and-enforcement-of-judgment treaty.
Efforts to conclude a reciprocal judgment treaty failed even with
one of the United States closest allies and trading partners, the
United Kingdom. 4
In short, a lending bank cannot always be certain in
advance of dispute that its debtor will have attachable assets in a
jurisdiction with effective rules for enforcing foreign judgments.35 Some national legal systems contain provisions for
enforcing foreign judgments, while others do not.36 Because a
debtor's attachable assets are sometimes found outside the judgment forum or in countries with inadequate rules for recognition
of foreign judgments, international bankers must on occasion
contemplate arbitration as an alternative to litigation in order to
have the benefits of an award enforceable under the New York
Convention.
III.

ACTS AND ASSETS OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS

To reduce situations in which judges risk upsetting the foreign policy being pursued by the executive branch of governYork law apply to their contracts. See N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-1402 (McKinney
1989).
33. Absent the special coverage of § 5-1402 Gen. Obl. Law, some link to New
York-subject matter, doing business, cause of action or parties-is required by N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 1314(b)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1987) and N.Y. Banking Law § 200-b (McKinney
1990).
34. In 1976 the U.S. and the U.K. initialed a Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, Oct. 26, 1976, United States-United
Kingdom (unratified), 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977). Among the reasons for the failure of the treaty
were British concerns over recognition of U.S. antitrust and products liability cases. See
generally Hay & Walker, The ProposedRecognition of Judgments Convention Between the
United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEx. IN'rL L.J. 421 (1976); North, The Draft
U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 N.W.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219
(1979); Smit, The Proposed U.S.-U.K. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments: A Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977); see also Bishop &
Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16
IN'L LAW. 425, 427 (1982).
35. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
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went, courts dealing with cases that have an international
dimension sometimes refuse to enforce rights as they would in a
domestic context. Judges may refrain from calling into question
foreign governmental acts, including exchange controls, even if
they violate basic national public policy or international law.
This judicial restraint has been referred to as the "act of state"
doctrine. For similar reasons, courts sometimes decline to assert
jurisdiction over foreign nations or their assets on the ground
that a foreign sovereign is entitled to jurisdictional immunity
from suit and attachment of its property.
The Act-of-State Doctrine
In the United States, the act-of-state doctrine requires
judges to defer to acts of a foreign government done within its
own territory, even when contrary to the forum's own fumdamental public policy. 37 For example, American courts have felt
compelled by the act-of-state doctrine to give effect to foreign
expropriation of property without adequate compensation.38
The doctrine is an English as well as American obsession.39
Continental jurisprudence, however, usually provides more contrasts than parallels. 40
Much debate has focused on the theoretical basis of the actof-state doctrine. The underpinnings of the doctrine derive from
turn of the century choice of law theory, which held that the
legitimacy of an act must be determined by the law of the counA.

37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 (1987). Section
443 formulates the act-of-state doctrine as follows:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining
the validity of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or
from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a
foreign state within its own territory and applicable there.
38. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
39. See generally Buttes Gas & Oil v. Hammer (No. 3), [1982] A.C. 888. Buttes
obtained a concession from the Ruler of Shaijah to drill for oil in territorial waters that
were extended from three to twelve miles around the island of Abu Musa, interfering with
Occidental Petroleum's similar concession from the ruler of neighboring Umm al Qaiwai.
Id at 888-89. The judge held that the relevant principle was not the form of the act-ofstate doctrine, but rather the need for judicial restraint because of foreign relations issues.
Id. at 906. Most of the claim was held to be nonjusticable since the court would have to
enter a judicial no-man's land to review the transactions. Id. at 907-19.
40. Some Continental courts will refuse recognition to foreign governmental acts that
violate the forum's public policy, such as nationalization of alien-owned property without
adequate compensation. See B. ANCEL & Y. LEQUETTE, GRANDS ARRtTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE FRANgAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVf, 85-86 (1987) (discussing Estat
Russe v. La Ropit and C.F.C.B. v. Atard).

1991]

TRANS-BORDER FINANCE

1335

try where the act is done.41 By the time the Supreme Court
revisited the doctrine in the 1960s, however, American judges
had considered a new justification, based on the constitutional
separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. 42
It was suggested that courts should not hinder the President and
State Department in the conduct of foreign policy by passing
judgment on the validity of acts affecting property within the
territory of foreign governments with which the executive
branch might have to negotiate.43
In some ways the act-of-state -doctrine resembles what is
commonly called "comity," a trans-border golden rule encouraging nations to accept each other's acts as they would have
their own accepted. Comity calls for courts to defer to foreign
acts, but only if consistent with the courts' domestic public

policy.
Unlike comity, the act-of-state doctrine bars courts from
41. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909); see also Chow,
Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdictionto Prescribe, 62
WASH. L. REv. 397, 404-11 (1987).
42. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-27 (1964). In 1964,
the Court decided the well-known Sabbatino case which involved expropriated Cuban
sugar sold to Morocco by a New York sugar broker. The bill of lading, representing the
right to take delivery of the sugar, ended up in New York. Holding that title to the sugar
was held by the Cuban government rather than the expropriated owner, the Supreme Court
found "constitutional underpinnings" for its decision in the separation of powers between
the executive and judicial branches of government.
43. See Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in InternationalBanking, 50 OHIO ST. L.. 1067,
1073-74 (1989). Courts have noted at least four qualifications to judicial unwillingness to
call into question foreign governmental acts. First, the prohibition on examining the validity of foreign law might not apply when the State Department so requests. This "Bernstein
exception" (so called for one Mr. Bernstein who sued to recover property confiscated by the
Nazis, Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1954); Bernstein v. Van Heygen Fr~res Soci6t6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 722 (1947)) was elaborated in a case in which the State
Department asked the court to ignore the act-of-state doctrine, and restore the property to
its original owner. Secondly, the act-of-state doctrine will not necessarily prevent the foreign act from being called into question where property is confiscated by the foreign state in
clear violation of a treaty. Third, the Hickenooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1988), enacted in reaction to the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino, provides that
courts cannot use the act-of-state doctrine as an excuse not to decide the validity under
international law of a confiscation of property, unless the President determines that the
doctrine should apply based on U.S. foreign policy interests. The Hickenlooper Amendment applies only to cases involving title to tangible property located in the United States.
Id. Finally, there is some support for the existence of a commercial activities exception to
the act-of-state doctrine. In one case, the Supreme Court refused to apply the act-of-state
doctrine when based on a repudiation of a commercial obligation. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694-95 (1976). However, only a minority of the Court based its decision on the commercial activities exception; thus, the authority for this exception remains
unclear.
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questioning a foreign governmental act even if it runs counter to
domestic public policy. 4 Assume, for example, that a borrower
in Azania is subject to a decree of the Azanian Finance Ministry
prohibiting until further notice any debt repayment in nonAzanian currency. 45 An American lender brings an action for
repayment of the debt in New York, where the borrower has
assets. Comity would lead to recognition of the foreign decrees
only if the court in New York deems the decrees to be in line
with American policy. 46 The act-of-state doctrine, on the other
hand, would prohibit calling the exchange control decrees into
question regardless of whether they are consistent with American policy, as long as the decrees affect a debt located within
Azanian territory.47
Locating a debt for act-of-state purposes is not an easy exercise. Intangibles, including the duty to repay a loan, have no
fixed situs that can be determined in the way one would locate
physical property such as wood, sugar, or a bill of lading. The
debt may be evidenced merely by an entry on a bank's books and
in its computers.
The starting point for situating an obligation to repay
money would normally be to ask which country has jurisdiction
over the debtor. If debtors are resident in Azania, one might
44. Compare with French doctrine, which allows refusal of recognition to a foreign
act that violates French public policy. See B. ANCEL & Y. LEQUErTE, supra note 40, at
80-88. French doctrine seems to be similar to the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2), in that as to tangible property which has found its way into France, French
courts do not recognize acts by foreign sovereigns that are contrary to French ordrepublic.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45. This is exactly what happened in Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.),acerL dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). Three Costa Rican
banks defaulted on debt to a syndicate of U.S. and European banks as a result of a similar
decree by the finance minister of Costa Rica. In an effort to recover the approximately $4.5
million principal plus accrued interest, the lending institutions, led by Allied Bank, brought
an action against the Costa Rican banks in New York, the agreed place of payment for the
U.S. dollar denominated obligation. The district court refused to call into question the
Costa Rican decree. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cantaso, 566 F. Supp.
1440, 1443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court of appeals affirmed, but based its decision on
"comity" rather than the act-of-state doctrine. 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984). Less than one
year later, after much fuss and consternation in the financial community, the same three
judges on the same court of appeals granted a rehearing, vacated their prior decision, and
ordered the district court to grant summary judgment for the syndicate of lending banks.
Allied Bank Int'l, 757 F.2d at 523. The judges on rehearing found the Costa Rican decree
inconsistent with United States policy, and held the debt situs to be outside Costa Rica. See
generally Park, supra note 43.
46. See Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519.
47. Id at 521.
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conclude that the debt had its situs in Azania. The problem, of
course, is that other countries may claim concurrent jurisdiction
over contractual disputes arising out of the same debtor/creditor

relationship.
Courts are divided about application of the act-of-state doctrine when borrowers have agreed to payment outside their
home country in a currency other than the money of the country
imposing the exchange controls. An obligation to repay U.S.
dollars in New York, for example, would normally be deemed
situated outside Azania, notwithstanding the Azanian residence
of the borrower.4" In some cases the law governing the loan
agreement will determine whether American courts give effect to
foreign exchange control decrees. 49
On occasion, a debt will be found to have its situs in the
foreign country imposing the exchange controls.50 In such a
case, the lender may not be able to recover on the loan, since
American courts would normally abstain from judging the validity of the decree. This rule would apply not only to a loan, but

equally to a bank deposit (the bank's debt to its customer) at a
foreign branch of an American bank.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, however, the situation
48. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984), in which
Chase Manhattan customers had sued to recover on peso certificates of deposit purchased
in Cuba in 1958 and confiscated the next year by Castro's revolutionary government.
Although Chase had already turned over to the Cuban government the amount of the
certificate of deposit, the court said that Chase had to pay again, this time to the depositor.
Id. at 650-57. In effect, the court read into the deposit agreement what has been called a
"last plane out" clause, by which in time of local national crisis (when the customer
escaped on the last plane for Miami) the money would be transferred from the country of
deposit to a safer haven.
In a different case, however, decided two days later, the highest state court in New
York reached a contrary result in an almost identical set of facts involving the same bank
but a different depositor. In Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d
5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984), the New York Court of Appeals held that the act-of-state
doctrine did apply to preclude inquiry into the validity of the Cuban expropriation. The
presence of a Chase branch in Cuba meant the debt could be paid there. The fact that there
were other countries where the deposit could also have been paid was not relevant.
For a critique of traditional rules that determine debt situs for conflict of laws purposes, see generally Rogerson, The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws, 49 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 441 (1990).
49. Citibank v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990), vacating and remanding 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Second
Circuit with instructions to determine what law applied to a Wells Fargo deposit with
Citibank's Manila branch. On the Wells Fargo saga, see generally Smedresman &
Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,MultinationalBanks, and NationalLaws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733,
762-74 (1989).
50. See, e.g., Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 420, 463 N.E.2d at 4, 474 N.Y.S. at 692.
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would be brighter for the creditor whose claim is deemed to be
in the country imposing exchange controls. In November 1988,
the Act was amended to provide that "[e]nforcement of... arbitral awards, and execution upon judgments based on orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the act
of state doctrine."' 51 Thus, in a case in which a court does not
feel it can manipulate the debt situs out of a country imposing
exchange controls, an arbitration agreement or award will give
considerable leverage to a lender faced with the argument that
exchange controls prohibit loan repayment.
B.

Sovereign Immunity

In March 1990, a settlement for £ 182 million between the
International Tin Council (I.T.C.) and its creditors put an end to
a dispute over the suspension of I.T.C. buffer stock operations
five years earlier.5 2 Six months before the settlement, the British
House of Lords had interpreted the I.T.C. Headquarters Agreement with the United Kingdom as granting the I.T.C. sovereign
immunity 3 from suits arising out of the claims of I.T.C.
5
creditors.
The same Headquarters Agreement, however, had also provided that the I.T.C. would not benefit from immunity in the
enforcement of arbitration awards that might be obtained
against the I.T.C.5 4 This was good news for the London and

51. 9 U.S.C. § 15. An error in drafting has resulted in two different sections numbered 15 in the Federal Arbitration Act. The section dealing with the inapplicability of the
act-of-state doctrine was enacted by Pub. L. 100-669 on November 16, 1988. Three days
later another section was also numbered 15; this second section 15, permitting appeals from
orders confirming or denying confirmation of awards, modifying or vacating awards, and
granting injunctions against arbitration, was added by Pub. L. 100-702 on November 19,
1988.
52. International Tin Council, Press Release (Mar. 30, 1990) (discussing settlement
to ITC creditors).
53. J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade, 3 W.L.R. 969, 3 All E.R. 523 (H.L. 1989).
Article 8 of the 1972 Headquarters Agreement (which tracks the relevant privileges-andimmunities article of the operative International Tin Council Agreement itself) reads:
The council shall have immunity from jurisdiction and execution except: (a) to
the extent that the council shall have expressly waived such immunity in a particular case; ... (c) in respect of an enforcement of an arbitration award made under
either article 23 or article 24.
Id. at 996, 3 All E.R. at 539. Article 23 provided for arbitration, as discussed infra note
54.
54. Id at 996, 3 All E.R. at 539. Article 8 of the Headquarters Agreement of Feb. 9,
1972, provided that the I.T.C. "shall have immunity from jurisdiction and execution except
•.. (c) in respect of enforcement of an arbitration award made under either Article 23 or
24." Id This provision of the Headquarters Agreement was given effect by the Interna-

1991]

TRANS-BORDER FINANCE

1339

Malaysian Metal Exchanges, since arbitration clauses are standard in metal trading contracts. The banks, however, were in a
different situation: few had incorporated arbitration clauses in
their loan agreements. 5 Those financial institutions with a
claim subject to an arbitration clause benefited from the waiver
of immunity with respect to arbitration stipulated in the Headquarters Agreement. 6 They also benefited from an implicit
waiver of immunity provided by the United Kingdom State
Immunity Act, applicable when a state or state7 entity has agreed
in writing to submit a dispute to arbitration.
The defense of sovereign immunity interacts with, but is
distinct from, the act-of-state doctrine. Sovereign immunity is
not a choice-of-law rule. It is, rather, a limit on jurisdiction that
prevents one sovereign from hauling another into the courts of
the former. In a financial context, the sovereign immunity
defense usually will be invoked when a foreign government or an
agency of a foreign government is the borrower. The act-of-state
tional Tin Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order of 1972, which provided similar
immunity. Article 23 of the ITC Headquarters Agreement, referred to above, provided:
Where the Council enters into contracts... with a person resident in the United
Kingdom or a body incorporated or having its principal place of business in the
United Kingdom and embodies the terms of the contract in a formal instrument,
that instrument shall include an arbitration clause whereby any disputes arising
out of the interpretation or execution of the contract may at the request of either
party be submitted to private arbitration.
Id at 896, 3 All E.R. at 540.
55. The House of Lords stated that with one exception none of the loan contracts
implicated in this action contained an arbitration clause. The exception noted by the court
was the agreement with Kleinwort Benson, whose loan contract did contain an arbitration
clause but in respect of which no arbitration proceedings had been prosecuted. J.H.Rayner, 3 W.L.R. at 999, 3 All E.R. at 542. Since all the banks were paid a proportion of their
debts ex gratia, Kleinwort Benson's arbitration clause did not affect the amount which it
ultimately received. See generally I.T.C. Headquarters Agreement, arts. 8, 9, 16, 23, in
J.H.Rayner, 3 W.L.R. at 981-96, 3 All E.R. at 539-42.
56. An express waiver of immunity would also do the trick. In Standard Chartered
Bank v. I.T.C., 1 W.L.R. 641 (Q.B. 1987), the bank required a waiver of immunity in its
loan facility letter to I.T.C., which the court upheld against I.T.C. Ironically, in this case
the LT.C. argued that failure to incorporate an arbitration clause in the credit agreement
(as provided in Article 23 of the Headquarters Agreement) prevented an express waiver of
immunity from being effective, an argument the court rejected "without reluctance." Ma at

642, 648.
57. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 9:

(1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or
may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the
courts of the United Kingdom which relate to the arbitration.

(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision in the arbitration
agreement and does not apply to any arbitration agreement between States.
See generally C. LEwis, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 74-75, 166-81 (3d ed. 1990).
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doctrine, on the other hand, may be invoked even by a private
debtor subject to exchange control decrees or a loan repayment
moratorium.
The modem rationale for sovereign immunity mirrors the
justification for the act-of-state doctrine: judges should not complicate international matters for the executive branch of government.18 In asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, the
judiciary risks hindering the conduct of foreign relations.
A distinction between commercial activity and public activity is at the root of what is referred to as the "restrictive" theory
of immunity. This theory is restrictive in contrast to the older
theory of complete or absolute immunity with respect to all
acts. 9 In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA)60 distinguishes between a foreign state's public
acts-acts jure imperii-andits commercial acts-acts jure gestionis. Immunity from jurisdiction will attach to public acts, but
will not prevent suit in cases arising from the state's entry into
the marketplace. The relevant statutory language setting forth
the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity reads in part as
follows:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case... in
which the action is based upon... an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state... and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.61
The term "foreign state" in the FSIA includes emanations
of the state in the form of a state "agency or instrumentality." A
corporate entity that is a separate legal person, but whose shares
are owned by the foreign state, would therefore be entitled to
immunity.
A Swiss wrinkle to sovereign immunity requires a link
58. One French jurist articulated the policy underpinnings even more forcefully: "On

ne doit pas donner aux juges la possibilitd de faire des btlisme "
59. The absolute theory of sovereign immunity is illustrated by a British case of the
last century, Mighel v. Sultan of Johore, 1 Q.B. 149 (C.A. 1894). Under an assumed name
the Sultan had proposed marriage. When he later changed his mind, the woman sued him
for breach of promise. The Sultan successfully escaped the consequences of his rash proposal by pleading sovereign immunity.

60. The statute permits express waiver of immunity from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(1988). Waiver immunity from suit, however, does not necessarily guarantee that the creditor will be able to execute the judgment against foreign assets. As to immunity from execution, see id. § 1610.
61. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
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between the foreign act and Switzerland before Swiss courts will
accept jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign on its assets. The
concept of "internal connection"-Binnenbeziehung-bars
attachment of foreign state assets in Switzerland in a dispute
whose subject matter is unconnected to Switzerland, even when
an arbitral award in the dispute is rendered within Swiss
territory.62
To elaborate the concept of "commercial activity," value
judgments must be made about the proper role of government.
Any merchant can purchase boots or wheat. However, in some
societies the purchase of boots by the army, or wheat for the
general population, might be viewed as a public act. Socialist
countries, of course, traditionally have not distinguished
between public and commercial acts, although their internal law
generally recognizes arbitration as a waiver of immunity.63
From the American perspective, whether or not an activity
is commercial is determined by the nature of the transaction, not
by its purpose. This general principle, set forth in the FSIA, 64 is
amplified as to financial transactions by a helpful legislative history. The report of the House Judiciary Committee provides
that "both a sale of bonds to the public and a direct loan from a
U.S. commercial bank to a foreign government are activities
which are of a commercial nature and' 65 should be treated like
other similar commercial transactions.

The British statute is even clearer. The 1978 State Immunity Act 66 explicitly defines a commercial transaction, as to

which states are normally not entitled to claim sovereign immunity, to include "any loan or other transaction for the provision
of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect
of any such
' 67
transaction or of any other financial obligation.
62. The issue of Binnenbeziehung can arise both when a foreign judgment is being
enforced against a foreign state, and also when a foreign state invokes Swiss ordrepublic to
prevent recognition of an arbitral award against the state. The doctrine ofBinnenbeziehung
requires a showing of certain minimum contacts between the dispute and Switzerland
before enforcement of a judgment or award against a foreign state. The LIAMCO saga is
one of the best known applications of the Binnenbeziehung doctrine by Swiss courts. See
Note, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO), 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (1981). For the American aspect of LIAMCO, see 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980).
63. See the discussion in Park, supra note 43, at 1079-801.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
65. H.R. REp. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1976).
66. See generally C. LEWIS, supra note 57, at 42-44.
67. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(3)(b).
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Judicial decisions in several countries have held arbitration
clauses to constitute waivers of immunity not only from jurisdiction, but also for purposes of judicial recognition of the arbitral
award. 8 The 1988 amendments to the FSIA are more explicit,
however, and restrict not only immunity from suit, but also
immunity from execution, when the creditor invokes an arbitration clause or award in an attempt to prevent attachment of
assets. First, the FSIA now generally denies a foreign state
immunity from the jurisdiction of American courts in an action
to enforce an arbitration agreement or to confirm an arbitral
award.69 This limit on jurisdictional immunity has both a territorial and a treaty link. An arbitration agreement or award will
be enforceable notwithstanding a claim for sovereign immunity
if (i) the arbitration takes place in the United States, or (ii) the
agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty calling for
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. The latter
would include the 1958 New York Convention. Nothing is said
about an award rendered outside the United States and beyond
the scope of an American treaty commitment. 70
Having cleared the hurdle of the sovereign's immunity from
suit, a bank still has to enforce any judgment in its favor. Immunity from execution of a judgment against a foreign state's assets
is distinct from its immunity from jurisdiction. The real advantage to a lender of arbitration awards over foreign judgments lies
at this stage.
Normally, the FSIA provides that a judgment against a foreign state can be executed only against property used in the same
commercial activity upon which the claim is based. A functional connection is required between the state-owned property
to be attached and the commercial activity that gave rise to the
claim in the first place. Only property used in the same commercial activity on which the claim is based will not benefit from
immunity.71 In the case of a loan, this "same activity" nexus
68. See, e.g., Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 826
(D.D.C. 1978); Judgment of Nov. 18, 1986, Cour de cassation Re Chambre civile, 76 Revue
Critique de Droit InternationalPfivi 786-92. See generally G. DELAUME, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL CoNTRAcs 394-97 (1988).

69. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988).
70. Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-669, 100 Stat. 3969 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610).
71. Some property, such as central bank funds (absent an explicit waiver of immunity), is always immune, unless perhaps the central bank functions as a commercial bank in
a particular transaction.
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requirement will normally pose serious problems for the lender,
effectively limiting attachment of assets to cases where funds
have been earmarked for debt reimbursement. When the debtor
defaults, however, such funds are likely to be scarce.
The 1988 amendments to the FSIA remove this nexus
requirement with respect to arbitral awards. The statute now
provides as follows:
The property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for
a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment in aid of execution . . . upon a judgment
entered by a court of the United States or of a State ... if...
the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award
rendered against the foreign State, provided that attachment in
aid of execution, or execution, would not be inconsistent with
any provision in the arbitral agreement.72
The FSIA, of course, talks here only about attachment after
an award has been made. Pre-award attachment, as Rudyard
Kipling might have written, remains another story.
IV.

THE WORLD DEBT CRISIS

The global money addiction that helped to fuel the world
debt crisis of the past decade adds a special dimension to dispute
resolution in trans-border finance.73 Arbitration affects the
calculus of financial dispute resolution in three principal contexts: (i) rescheduling problem loans, (ii) developing country
project financing, and (iii) debt/equity swaps.
A.

Loan Rescheduling

Even when lenders have enough economic muscle to
impose their own substantive law in a debt restructuring agreement, borrowers may refuse to yield to the choice-of-forum
clause designating the lenders' own countries' courts. The
rescheduling agreement between Brazil and its lending banks
provides that New York law will govern the debtor/creditor
arrangements. The Brazilian borrowers nevertheless insisted on
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 74
The arbitration clause in the Brazilian rescheduling agree72. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6).
73. On the world debt crisis, see generally Park, supra note 43. The origins of the
crisis include recycling of petrodollars, an imbalance in the terms of trade, inflation, corruption, and bad management by both lenders and borrowers.
74. See Deposit Facility Agreement Between Banco Central de Brasil and Republica
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ment takes an eclectic approach. Each party names an arbitrator, and the party-appointed arbitrators then name the
chairman. If the party-appointed arbitrators cannot agree on
the chairman, the President of the World Bank makes the
appointment. As a last resort, the appointing authority is the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in London. The World
Bank's ICSID treaty75 applies to the proceedings unless inconsistent with the terms of the rescheduling agreement, in which case
the agreement prevails.
B.

IndustrialDevelopment Projects

Project finance for developing countries provides another
fertile ground in which to test the ability of arbitration to keep
pace with the crises and opportunities of the world's increasingly
integrated financial markets. 76 In the saga of French-Iranian
cooperation in nuclear energy, credit arrangements were part of
the 1974 agreement by which the French atomic energy commission (Commisariat Frangais ' l'Energie Nucleaire-CEA) would
provide Iran with services, expertise, and access to natural and
enriched uranium supplies.77 The project was memorialized by
an intergovernmental "Agreed Minute on Cooperation. 7 8 In
1975, the Minute was supplemented by several specific private
agreements including a Joint Venture Agreement 79 and a Loan
Agreement. 80 The former covered the industrial elements of the
cooperation; the latter supplied the financial elements. Article
III of the Joint Venture Agreement provided that without the
Federativa de Brasil (as guarantor, and Citibank, N.A. (as agent)) et al., § 12.08(a)-(b),
Sept. 22, 1988.
75. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1965, art. 55, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
1292 T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Treaty].
76. Arbitration agreements would appear particularly well suited to loan agreements
entered into by public financial institutions within the United Nations system, such as the
Inter-American Investment Bank, that engage in project financing for developing countries.
77. Judicial description of the arbitrations arising from this multifaceted dispute are
contained in Judgment of March 20, 1989, Cour de cassation, Ire Chambre civile, 1989
Rev. Arb.653-67 comment P. Fouchard, and Judgment of June 28, 1989, Cour de cassation Ire Chambre civil, 1989 Rev. Arb.653-57 comment P. Fouchard. The Cour de cassation held that a court's right to order interim measures of protection did not permit judicial
examination of the merits of the dispute.
78. See discussion in French Cour de cassation Judgments of Mar. 20, 1989, and June
28, 1989, supra note 77, and Swiss Tribunal fed6ral Judgment of May 17, 1990, discussed
infra note 86.
79. See supra note 78.
80. Id.
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loan, the cooperation between the two nations would cease."'
In return for French help in developing its nuclear energy
capacity, Iran agreed to make loans to the French. One loan, in
an amount of $1 billion, was made to the CEA8 2 The Loan
Agreement of 23 February 1975 between the Imperial Government of Iran and the CEA provided for an advance of one billion U.S. dollars to be repaid in nine annual installments
3
beginning seven years after the drawdown of each tranche
The Loan Agreement was governed by Iranian law, but in article
X provided that "[a]ny disputes arising in connection with this
Agreement .

.

. shall be settled finally in Geneva" under the

Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
84
Commerce.
After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the complicated arrangements between Iran and France gave rise to several arbitrations,
and ancillary litigation in both Geneva and Paris. Organizations
representing CEA obtained attachments in France of Iranian
claims against CEA.85 A court action on the merits was stayed
pending outcome of the arbitration.
An I.C.C. arbitration pursuant to Article X of the $1 billion
loan agreement was commenced in October 1984, and in August
1986 the arbitrators and the parties signed the formal Terms of
Reference setting forth the specific mission of the arbitral tribunal.86 Pursuant to these Terms of Reference the arbitrators
ruled in an interim award rendered in December 1988 that the
arbitral proceedings should be stayed pending outcome of a
81. Id.
82. A separate French franc loan was made to a related entity called Eurodif. The
award of December 22, 1990 has not yet been made public, but was reported in the Paris
press earlier this year. See Eurodifest condammddpayer 940 millions defrancs d l'Iran,Le
Monde, Jan. 1, 1991, at 16.
83. See Swiss Tribunal fed6ral Judgment of May 17, 1990, discussed infra note 86.
84. Id.
85. The attachment was challenged on the basis of Iran's sovereign immunity. After
lower court skirmishes, the Cour de cassation ruled that the commercial nature of the loan
did not permit a defense of sovereign immunity, and this decision was followed by the
Court of Appeals of Versailles in July 1986.
86. I.C.C. Arbitration No. 5124. By 1986, the amount of Iran's claim, including
principal and interest, had grown to $2.15 billion. See decision of Swiss Tribunal f&l6dral
(T.F.) in C.E.A. contre Republique Islamique d'Iran, ATF 116 II, May 17, 1990, reported
in Semaine Judiciaire,1990, No. 26, at 566. A second arbitration concerned a 940 million
French franc loan made to the related entity, Eurodif. An award in the Eurodif arbitration
was rendered in Geneva on December 22, 1990, but has not yet been made public. See
Eurodifest condamnddpayer 940 millions defrancs d l'Iran, Le Monde, Jan. 1, 1991, at 16.
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related arbitration taking place in France.8 7 This ruling was subsequently overturned by the Geneva Cour dejustice, whose decision was upheld by the Swiss Supreme Court (Tribunalfdddral)
in May of 1990.88
C. Debt/Equity Swaps
Secondary market exchanges of developing-country debt for
equity in local businesses has permitted some banks to sell hardcurrency problem loans to industrial or commercial enterprises
in need of soft currencies in debtor countries. Through central
banks, the industrial or commercial enterprise then turns in its
hard currency claims for the borrower's local national currency,
which is then invested in local commercial or industrial enterprises. For example, the U.S. dollars owed an American bank
by Brazilian borrowers might be swapped for cruzados to
finance an automobile manufacturing plant. Or a travel service
company might purchase Mexican debt at a discount in order to
obtain the equivalent face value of pesos to pay the local bills of
its credit card customers.8 9
If bankers or third-party enterprises do engage in debt
reduction through a swap of loans for equity participation in a
local enterprise, an arbitration. agreement in the investment contract provides a measure of security (albeit only relative) against
expropriation without adequate compensation. Such arbitration
might proceed under the rules of private institutions such as the
American Arbitration Association, the International Chamber
of Commerce, and the London Court of International Arbitration. Or, arbitration might be instituted under the auspices of
the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. 90
American recognition of arbitration agreements and
awards 91 has not always been shared by the developing world.
87. Sofidif v. Iran, I.C.C. Arbitrarion No. 3683.
88. See C.E.A. v. Iran, reported in Semaine Judiciaire, 1990, supra note 86.
89. See AmexCo Seeks to Use Mexico's Debt, Int'l Herald Tribune, Jan. 14, 1988, at 9,
col. 2. Conservation groups such as the World Wildlife Fund have also promoted exchange
of LDC debt for conservation commitments in the Amazon jungle, Philippines, and Africa.
See Post, Debt for Nature Swaps, 24 INT'L LAW. 1071 (1990).
90. ICSID Treaty, supra note 75.
91. On the developing acceptance of arbitration agreements by American courts, see
Park, PrivateAdjudication and the Public Interest, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 629 (1986).
See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614

(1985).

1991]

TRANS-BORDER FINANCE

1347

In 1974, notions of a "New International Economic Order" were
incorporated into a controversial United Nations General
Assembly Resolution entitled "The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States." 92 Presumably, the Charter would apply
to disputes relating to equity investment that replaced loans subsequent to a debt/equity swap.
The 1974 Charter rejected the principle that compensation
for expropriation of foreign-owned property should be determined according to neutral international tribunals. The Charter
requires compensation for nationalized property to be determined solely by host-state courts, which effectively excludes neutral arbitration by providing that "[i]n any case where the
question of compensation [for expropriated property] gives rise
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals ....
The Charter echoes the approach of the nineteenth-century
Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, who proposed a general principle
of equal treatment for Latin American nationals and foreign
investors, which has the effect of barring neutral international
arbitral tribunals for settlement of trans-border investment disputes. The so-called "Calvo doctrine" finds its embodiment in
legislative and constitutional provisions of many Latin American countries granting exclusive jurisdiction to local courts. 94 A
Latin American court therefore could refuse to recognize a
forum-selection clause that contravenes local statutory enactments of the Calvo doctrine. Of course, this would not necessarily prevent the arbitrators themselves from rejecting the
enactment of the Calvo doctrine, and therefore taking jurisdiction over the dispute. At least one arbitrator has done so, in a
dispute concerning the Libyan government's nationalizations of
properties owned by American oil companies.95 Professor Ren6
Dupuy found the Charter grant of exclusive jurisdiction to host
country courts to be not legally binding.
V.

LENDER LIABILITY

An expression of catch-word quality, the term "lender lia92. See generally Park, Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic Development, 61
B.U.L. REv. 1321 (1981).
93. Charter Article 2(2)(c) (emphasis added). See generally W. CRAIG, W. PARK, J.
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 645-48 (1990).
94. See generally W. CRAIG, W. PARK & I. PAULSSON, supra note 93.
95. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
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bility" describes a set of situations in which banks have been
subject to an implicit requirement of "good faith" in their dealings with borrowers. In lender liability claims, borrowers invoke
banker-client understandings to obtain damages for refusal to
advance more funds, even if explicitly within the bank's discretion under the terms of a credit line. This populist concept in
essence makes the financier
at least a partial partner in the bor96
rower's business failure.
To discourage the large (or as the bankers would say,
"unreasonable") damages awarded by juries in lender liability
litigation, several American financial institutions now provide
for arbitration in credit agreements. 97 From a lender's perspective, arbitration commends itself because an arbitral panel presumably will be a more sophisticated trier of fact, less swayed by
solicitude for the borrower, than a civil jury whose own credit
problems may make them empathize with the unfortunate
debtor. Arbitral awards presumably will be less generous than
the verdicts of debtor-sympathetic juries. Moreover, arbitrators
have traditionally been less likely than juries to award punitive
damages. 98
96. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987). The jury awarded

$100,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages (the punitive damages were struck down as impermissible under Maine law in contract actions), for the
bank's breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing by terminating a line
of credit to owners of a paint business, despite the right to do so under the loan agreement.
See also KMC v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). See generally G.
BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY LOAN PRACTICE & PREVENTION (1989); J. BUTLER,
ARBITRATION IN BANKING (1988); A.B. CAPPELLO & F. KOMOROSKE, LENDER LIABILrry (1987); M. WEISSMAN, LENDER LIABILITY: How TO PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST

UNWARRANTED SUITS (1988); Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J.

131 (1989); Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for
Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 565-74 (1990); Golann, Taking ADR to the Bank
Arbitrationand Mediation in FinancialServices Disputes, 44 ARB.J. 3 (Dec. 1989); Hiller,
Good Faith Lending, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 783 (1988); Hoellering, Legal andPracticalAspects
of Arbitrating Banking Disputes, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 21 (1988); Johnson &

Gaffney, Lender Liability: Perspectives on Risk and Prevention, 105 BANKING L.J. 325
(1988); Lender Liability for Environmental Cleanup: Lender Scores PartialVictory, 9 Bus.
LAW. UPDATE 1 (1989); Lundquist, AlternativeDispute Resolution as a Settlement Strategy
in the Wake of Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, 43 Bus. LAW. 1095 (1988); Patterson,
Good Faith, Lender Liability and DiscretionaryAcceleration, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169 (1989);
Comment, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U.L. REV. 653 (1988); Lender Liability
Litigation (Boston Bar Continuing Legal Education Program Dec. 14, 1989) (seminar
materials).
97. See, e.g., model clauses adopted by Bank of California and Bank of America,
reprinted in Butler, ARBITRATION IN BANKING (R.M.A. 1988); see also Golann, Taking
ADR to the Bank, supra note 96.
98. Some cases (although not the emerging trend) have even held that arbitrators lack
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The best of all worlds for the lender, of course, would be an
arbitration clause granting the bank a unilateral right to elect
arbitration. 99 Arbitral proceedings generally involve less discovery than litigation before national courts. For lender liability
claims this is an uncertain blessing for both lender and borrower.
Rarely is it possible to predict in advance of the dispute what
discovery will reveal about banker-client "understandings."
VI.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT

When courts are asked to enforce arbitration clauses in loan
agreements, the interaction of exchange controls and the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement raises significant
questions of public policy. If repayment is problematic because
the debtor's country of residence has imposed exchange controls,
the task of interpreting these exchange controls may be too
important to be submitted to private arbitration-or so some
judges might feel.
Exchange control issues also arise when courts are asked to
enforce an arbitral award relating to the loan agreement. The
losing debtor may resist recognition of the award on the ground
that the arbitrator refused to respect the legitimate exchange
control regulations imposed by the country of the borrower's
residence. 100 The borrower might invoke either article V(2)(a) of
the New York Convention-permitting refusal of recognition to
awards dealing with "nonarbitrable" subject matter-or, more
likely, article V(2)(b)-the catch-all safety valve constituted by
the public policy defense. 0 1
Some areas of business law traditionally have been too hot
for arbitrators to handle. In the United States, courts have at
the power to award exemplary damages. See generally Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in
Arbitration, 66 B.U.L. REv. 953 (1986).
99. See Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 138-39, 535 N.E.2d 643, 646-47, 538
N.Y.S.2d 513, 535 (1989), finding that arbitration pursuant to an agreement between a real
estate salesman and his employer, at the employer's sole discretion, was not unconscionable
because of lack of mutuality. This case was decided under state law, however. The author
knows of no case decided under the Federal Arbitration Act that deals with the same issue.
100. Relevant exchange controls may be enacted by either the bank or the customer's
home country. In the case of a bank deposit, exchange controls might be those imposed by
the country in which the deposit-taking branch is established. See, e.g., Citibank v. Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990). In the case of a loan, on the other hand, the
exchange controls would likely be imposed by the customer's home country.
101. For text of article V of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention, see Appendix II.
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one time or another questioned the arbitrability of disputes concerning antitrust, securities legislation, patents, ERISA claims,
bankruptcy matters, the Commodities Exchanges Act, the Civil
Rights Act, and state franchise statutes. 10 2 "Non-negotiable"
legal rules in these areas are intended to create direct benefits not
only for private parties, but also for the community at large..
While all laws do or should affect societal interests in some way,
statutes that promote a fair stock market, free competition, or an
orderly treatment of bankruptcies have been perceived by some
judges to implicate what have been called public rights.
A suspicion of arbitrators is the central theme in nonarbitrability cases. Judges seem concerned that society will be
injured by private adjudication of public-law claims. This has
impelled judges to express a fear that public-law issues are too
complicated for arbitrators; that arbitration proceedings are too
infor:mal; or that arbitrators are like foxes guarding the chicken
coop, with a probusiness bias that will lead to underenforcement
of laws designed to protect the public. Lack of appeal on the
merits of arbitral awards in the United States makes arbitration
seem to some like a "black hole," to which claims for vindication of fundamental rights are sent and never heard from again.
Recently, an erosion of judicial resistance to arbitration of
public-law claims has been manifest not only with respect to
contracts containing an international element,1 03 but also in
domestic controversies. 4 Questionable in domestic transactions, the wisdom of this trend is hardly debatable in cases where
the parties' nationalities diverge. In a trans-border context, the
dramatically disagreeable consequences of a failed arbitration
102. See generally Park, PrivateAdjudicatorsand the PublicInterest" The Expanding
Scope of InternationalArbitration, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 629 (1986).

103. The line of Supreme Court cases in which forum-selection clauses have been
upheld in international contexts goes back sixteen years to Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974), in which the Supreme Court explicitly extended its recognition of
international forum-selection clauses to arbitration agreements that implicated securities
regulation, even if the dispute could not have been arbitrated in a purely domestic transaction. Id. at 519-20. In 1985, the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), announced that arbitration
agreements will be enforced in international contracts even if the claims relate to the fundamental, or "core," public policy issues raised by antitrust laws that are not arbitrable in a
domestic context. Id.
104. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917,
1922 (1989). The Court overruled precedent, and held enforceable a predispute agreement
to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933. The Securities Act no longer requires
resolution of claims exclusively in a judicial forum.
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clause may include proceedings brought in a foreign tongue
before a xenophobic judge of questionable independence.
Questions of subject matter arbitrability in trans-border
finance arise with regard to the International Monetary Fund
Articles of Agreement. To reduce distortion of transnational
trade and finance, article VIII(2)(a) of the Agreement prohibits
(without I.M.F. approval) restrictions on "current" transactions. The I.M.F. Agreement defines "current" transactions as
payments not for the purpose of transferring capital, including
"interest on loans... [and] payments of moderate amount for
amortization on loans."105
In tension with the free flow of payments on capital transactions is a requirement that I.M.F. member countries enforce
each others' exchange controls when imposed consistently with
the I.M.F. Agreement. Article VIII(2)(b) of the Agreement
provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of a member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member. 106
Thus, exchange controls of I.M.F. members may prevent
another member country's courts from enforcing the loan agreement if the loan agreement is deemed to constitute an "exchange
contract."10 7
As one might suspect, scholarly and judicial opinions are
not unanimous as to what constitutes an "exchange contract."
American 10 and English'0 9 cases tend to give a narrow interpre105. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art.
XXX, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, incorporatedwith the same words,
Second Amendment to the I.M.F. Articles, Apr. 1, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, 29 U.S.T.S.
2203 [hereinafter I.M.F. Articles].
106. Id art. VIII(2)(b).
107. The exchange controls must also be imposed consistently with the I.M.F. Agreement. This is to say, if the controls are approved by the I.M.F. or if the controls do not
restrict current transactions, which under article XXX(d) include interest on loans and
payment of moderate amounts for amortization of loans.
108. This question was addressed in Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,
570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), in which a $40 million loan from a syndicate headed by
a British bank to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica was intended to finance sugar production and exports. Id. at 874. On default consequent to exchange control decrees, suit
against the borrowers was brought in New York. Id. at 875. Because the loan was found
to have its situs outside Costa Rica, the act-of-state doctrine did not operate as a defense to
payment. Id at 881-82. Nor did the doctrine of comity apply to protect the borrower,
since the Costa Rican exchange control decrees constituted a confiscation of property with-
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tation to the term "exchange contract" that includes only swaps
or exchanges of one currency against another. German and
French legal doctrine takes a broader perspective. Continental
cases characterize as an exchange contract any contract that
affects a country's international balance of payments, including
an agreement between residents and nonresidents calling for
payment or transfer in either a domestic or a foreign currency.
Loans between residents of two different nations would thus be
subject to article VIII(2)(b) under the Continental view.110 Sir
Joseph Gold, former General Counsel of the I.M.F., has supported the broad interpretation under the theory that it furthers
the I.M.F. Agreement's purposes.'
The I.M.F. Agreement may interfere with nonjudicial resolution of loan disputes at different stages of the arbitral process.
In the first instance-when the lender wants to enforce the arbitration clause-a borrower might argue that a dispute implicating exchange controls should be considered nonarbitrable
because both the exchange controls and the I.M.F. Agreement (a
treaty obligation) represent public laws whose interpretation is
too important to be left to privately appointed arbitrators.
Although there may always be a settlement or an arbitration
agreement after the controversy arises, courts may wish to assert
a paternalistic protection of borrowers tempted to bargain away
out compensation, repugnant to the U.S. Constitution and laws. Id at 882. After judgment for the lender, the Banco Nacional asked to re-argue the case on the basis that the
loans were exchange contracts and that the Costa Rican currency regulations were imposed
consistently with the I.M.F. Id at 896-97. The court denied Banco Nacional's motion to
re-argue. Id at 902. It found no basis for equating loans with exchange contracts. Id at
897-900.
109. A narrow view was also taken in England by the House of Lords in United City
Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2 W.L.R. 1039, 2 All E.R. 720 (1982), involving a
letter of credit to finance a sale of equipment to a Peruvian company in violation of Peruvian exchange control regulations. Lord Diplock stated that an exchange contract was
"confined to contracts to exchange the currency of one country for the currency of
another." Id at 1050, 2 All E.R. at 729.
110. P. CRESSWELL, W. BLAIRE, G. HILL & P. WOOD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING LAW § F1604 (1987) (wide interpretation has been adopted by the Paris Court of
Appeal in de Boer, Widow Moojen v. Von Reichert, Judgment of June 20, 1961, Cour
d'appel, Paris, 89 J. Droit Int'l 718, in the German Court of Appeal in Lessinger v. Mirau,
22 I.L.R. 725 (1955), and in a Luxembourg Court in Soci6t6 Filature et Tissage X Jourdain
v. Epous Heynen-Bintner, 22 I.L.R. 727 (1955)). See generally Marks, Exchange Control
Regulations Within the Meaning of the Bretton Woods Agreement: A Comparison of Judicial Interpretationin the United States andEurope, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 104 (1990).
111. Gold, Article VIII Section 2(b) of the LM.F.Articles in its InternationalSetting,
in 6 LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE 65, 85 (1989).
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their rights in a predispute arbitration clause contained in the
loan agreement.
In the United States such an argument would probably fail.
American courts take a narrow view of what constitutes an
exchange contract. 112 Therefore the applicability of article
VIII(2)(b) would be excluded. Even if a judge were to have a
broader perspective of what constitutes an exchange contract,
American courts can be expected to permit arbitrators to interpret exchange controls. As mentioned above, American cases
have shown an increasing tendency to recognize arbitration of
other public-law issues 1 3 and to enforce arbitration agreements
in other international contracts even if the subject matter would
make the agreement unenforceable in a purely domestic
context. 114

Of course, if an arbitrator gets it wrong, and enforces a loan
agreement that violates exchange controls imposed consistently
with the I.M.F. Agreement, then the award might be refused
recognition, or even annulled, in a jurisdiction that broadly
interprets the term "exchange contract" to include trans-border
5
loans."

Allowing an arbitrator to decide the public-law claim raised
by article VIII(2)(b) seems the right result even if the award
later may be refused enforcement on grounds of public policy.
Such an imperfect accommodation of competing claims-the
search for a neutral forum weighed against the concern to safeguard public interests-responds to the special needs for neutrality in international commercial dispute resolution.
International commercial arbitration provides a level playing field on which transnational economic law is enforced. Arbitration normally justifies its role in the global wealth creation
process neither by speed nor by cost, but rather by neutrality of
forum and delocalized procedure. Arbitration avoids the
"hometown justice" of the adversary's own judicial system, and
112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
113. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917

(1989).
114. See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Sonatrach v. Distrigas, 80 Bankr. 606
(D. Mass. 1987). Professor Otto Sandrock of Miinster has come to a similar conclusion for
Germany, at least when art. VIII (2)(b) is not the only issue that the arbitrator must

address. See Sandrock, Are Disputes Over the Application of Article VIII § (2)(b) of the

IMF Treaty Arbitrable?,23 INT'L LAW. 933 (1989).
115. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
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reduces the idiosyncracies of national procedural law in matters
such as discovery, the rules of evidence, and examining witnesses. In a purely domestic context, an unenforceable arbitration clause may result in a trial in Atlanta rather than an
arbitration in Boston. In an international dispute, the alternative judicial proceedings may be before a xenophobic judge, in a
country in which political influence makes a fair trial problematic. Moreover, the litigation may take place in a foreign tongue;
not the variant of the language of Shakespeare used in our
Southland, but the languages of Demosthenes used in Athens, of
Moliere used in Paris, and of the Prophet Mohammed used in
Tripoli. Therefore it would seem best to permit a dispute to pass
through the strainer of neutral arbitration before judges later
review the award for conformity to a restricted standard of public policy: of what one court has called our "most basic notions
of morality and justice." '
The opportunity for judges to correct an arbitrator's mistaken interpretation of exchange-control legislation arises
because article V of the New York Convention gives courts at
the award enforcement stage an explicit "public policy" escape
hatch, permitting recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award to be refused if it would be contrary to the public policy
of the enforcement forum. 1 7 In the United States, this has led
to what has been called the "second look" doctrine, 1 8 by which
courts will have discretion to question an arbitral award at the
enforcement stage. A court that determines that an award contravenes American public policy may refuse to recognize the
award. It is uncertain, however, whether the second look
involves a broad examination of the arbitrator's application of
the law, or merely a mechanical examination of whether the
arbitrator considered American statutes. Vacating an award at
the place where rendered for violation of public policy is also
possible under the national law of many other vital arbitral
venues such as France and Switzerland. 1 9
VII.

CONCLUSION

A tale is told of a distinguished writer's visit to a school in
116. Parsons & Whittenmore Overseas Co. v. Soci&6 General de L'Industrie du
Papier (RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
117. New York Convention,'supra note 9, art. V(2)(b).
118. See Park, supra note 31, at 668-70.
119. See id. at 690-99.
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England. The students were being taught how to write fiction.
"Four elements," the writer told the class, "are indispensable to
a good short story: (1) God (most people having some religious
sense); (2) aristocracy (most people being snobs); (3) sex (no
explanation necessary); and (4) suspense (the spice of life)."
After the writer's talk, the headmistress asked the schoolchildren to craft a tale incorporating these four elements. To the
teacher's surprise, one girl raised her hand only three minutes
later. She'd done the job in two sentences: "Oh my Lord!,"
exclaimed the Duchess, "I'm pregnant. I wonder who it was?"
Sex, God, and aristocracy do not work into the story of
arbitration in international finance. But suspense does. For
some time to come, the cost-benefit calculations of bankers and
borrowers with respect to forum selection are likely to resist facile analysis.
First, borrowers will have an indeterminate amount of leverage in rescheduling negotiations. The Brazilian debt moratorium illustrates that in some cases borrowers may have enough
muscle to impose arbitration as an alternative to the lenders'
home-country courts.
A second element of suspense derives from the attitude of
some judges outside the United States toward loan contracts
implicating exchange controls. Continental case law has assimilated loan agreements to "exchange contracts." Under the
International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, an
exchange contract may be unenforceable when contrary to a
member state's exchange controls. 120 To some nations' courts,
therefore, the treaty obligations of the Agreement may constitute a public law too important to be interpreted by privately
appointed adjudicators.
Third, bankers may be slow to grasp the advantages of arbitration awards over court judgments when it is necessary to
enforce the loan against a borrower's foreign assets. The traditional banker's option for the arguably greater predictability of
courts may not be the wisest course if the borrower's assets are
located in a country with which the forum has no enforcementof-judgment treaties.
Fourth, arbitration presents special benefits to bankers
resisting sovereign immunity or act-of-state defenses raised by
foreign borrowers. Particularly in the United States, recent leg120. See supra text accompanying notes 105-17.
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islative enactments have increased the relative attractiveness to
lenders of arbitral awards over court judgments when the borrower is a foreign government or when the repayment obligation
is subject to exchange controls.
Finally, the role of arbitration in "lender liability" disputes
has yet to be explored fully. West Coast banks have taken the
lead in seeking to reduce the risk of high awards by agreeing to
send credit disputes to arbitrators rather than juries. However,
the same bankers have a countervailing desire for the traditional
predictability of courts in enforcing loan agreements. Arbitration may backfire. The possibility of a "wild card" adjudicator
or a "split the difference" decision is arguably greater in arbitration than in court proceedings, 12 ' since in most major arbitral
122
centers awards are not reviewable for error of law.
From a policy perspective what matters is that the relative
reliability of credit arrangements should continue to promote
world economic development.123 If loan contracts are not
enforceable, banks will not lend money. Loans are loans, not
gifts or capital contributions. By their nature loans are meant to
be repaid. Therefore arbitration agreements that make a loan
more enforceable will contribute to world wealth creation. Loan
recovery is likely to be enhanced through arbitration (i) when
the borrower's assets are located outside the forum where the
award is granted, thus bringing the New York Convention into
play, (ii) when there is a possibility that the debtor will invoke
sovereign immunity or act-of-state defenses in resisting payment,
and (iii) when lender liability doctrines raise the specter of high
jury judgments for plaintiff borrowers.
121. On the "best of all possible worlds" solution of an option to arbitrate that may
be exercised only by the banker, see discussion of the Sablosky case at note 99 supra.
122. Most countries, however, do permit review of awards for procedural irregularity. See Park, supra note 31, at 689-97.
123. A recent affirmation of the public international law foundations of loan enforceability was made by Professor Lazar Focsaneanu at the Sixty-Third Conference of the
International Law Association in Warsaw in 1988. See Focsaneanu, Annual Report, 63
I.L.A. 458, 462 (comments of Professor L. Focsaneanu in the working session chaired by
Professor Cynthia Lichtenstein, Aug. 23, 1988):
....
tout ce que nous discutons ici sur une 6ventuelle obligation des Etats i
ren6gocier leurs crinnces affaiblit la rigueur du droit international. Une hypoth6tique obligation pour les Etats de ren6 gocier leurs criances Equivaudrait au droit
pour les d6biteurs de ne pas payer leur dettes. Un tel droit n'existe pas et ne doit
pas exister.
Je ne trouve dans le droit international traditionnel aucune r6gle 6tablie qui
permette aux Etats de ne pas payer leurs dettes.
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Arbitration's role in promoting certainty in the enforcement
of loan agreements is a complex business, however. Arbitration
implies a renunciation of summary court proceedings available
in certain national legal systems. Arbitration may end up being
longer and more expensive than a judicial resolution of the dispute, particularly in cases in which arbitrators lack effective
means to obtain compliance with interim orders. Business managers resisting enforcement of an arbitration agreement will usually delight in the opportunity to add cost and delay to the
dispute resolution process. The inevitable opportunities for dilatory tactics in arbitration include the process of court challenge
of awards both where rendered and where presented for recognition or enforcement.
In the end, arbitration's role in trans-border finance will
depend on how bankers and borrowers evaluate the available
alternatives. Will a court judgment enforcing the loan be rendered in a place where the borrower has assets? Will the New
York Convention apply to the enforcement of an award? Will
judges be more predictable than arbitrators because of their
inclination and training to follow precedent? Will borrowers
invoke defenses based on sovereign immunity, exchange control
regulations, or lender liability doctrines? Will forum-selection
clauses be imposed by developing countries in debt rescheduling
agreements?
One thing is foreseeable, however: banks and their customers will have to learn to contemplate, if not to relish, the adjudicatory uncertainty inherent in the greater variety of alternatives
for dispute resolution available today in credit arrangements.
Paradoxically perhaps, enhancing the enforceability of international loan agreements requires that lenders learn to live with a
less routinized approach to dispute resolution that includes arbitration as an option.
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APPENDIX I

NEW YORK CONVENTION
ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
The following list which contains signatures, ratifications, accessions and extensions as of December 31, 1989 is reprinted from:
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 1989. New York: United Nations, 1990.
Done at New York on 10 June 1958
ENTRY INTO FORCE: 7 June 1959,
in accordance with article XII.
TEXT:

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 330, p. 3.

Participant
Algeria
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Belgium
Benin
Botswana
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Byelorussian SSR
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Columbia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia

Signature

28 Aug 1958

10 Jun 1958

17 Dec 1958
29 Dec 1958

10 Jun 1958

3 Oct 1958

Ratificationaccession or
succession
7 Feb
2 Feb
14 Mar
26 Mar
2 May
6 Apr
18 Aug
16 May
20 Dec
10 Oct
23 Mar
15 Nov
19 Feb
12 May
15 Oct
4 Sep
22 Jan
25 Sep
26 Oct
30 Dec
29 Dec
10 Jul

1989
1989
1989
1975
1961
1988
1975
1974
1971
1971
1987
1960
1988
1986
1962
1975
1987
1979
1987
1974
1980
1959
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Participant
Democratic Kampuchea
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Holy See
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Lesotho
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Republic of Korea
Romania

Signature

17 Dec 1958
10 Jun 1958
29 Dec 1958
25 Nov 1958
10 Jun 1958

10 Jun 1958
10 Jun 1958
10 Jun 1958

11 Nov 1958

31 Dec 1958
10 Jun 1958

Ratificationaccession or
succession
5 Jan
22 Dec
14 Jun
28 Oct
3 Jan
9 Mar

1959
1972
1983
1988
1962
1959

19 Jan
26 Jun
20 Feb
30 Jun
9 Apr
16 Jul
21 Mar
5 Dec
14 May
5 Mar
13 Jul
7 Oct
12 May
5 Jan
31 Jan
20 Jun
15 Nov
10 Feb
28 Apr
13 Jun
9 Sep
16 Jul
5 Nov
14 Apr
2 Jun
12 Feb
24 Apr
6 Jan
14 Oct
17 Mar
14 Mar

1962
1959
1975
1961
1968
1962
1984
1983
1975
1962
1960
1981
1981
1959
1969
1961
1979
1989
1978
1989
1983
1962
1985
1971
1982
1959
1964
1983
1964
1970
1961

10 Oct
7 Jul
6 Jul
3 Oct
8 Feb
13 Sep

1984
1988
1967
1961
1973
1961

30 Dec 1958
10 Jun 1958
10 Jun 1958

1360

TULANE LAW REVIEW

Participant

Signature

San Marino
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Ukranian SSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United Republic of Tanzania
United States of America
Uruguay
Yugoslavia

30 Dec 1958
23 Dec 1958
29 Dec 1958

29 Dec 1958
29 Dec 1958

[Vol. 65
Ratificationaccession or
succession
17 May
21 Aug
3 May
12 May
9 Apr
28 Jan
1 Jun
9 Mar
21 Dec
14 Feb
17 Jul
10 Oct
24 Aug
24 Sep
13 Oct
30 Sep
30 Mar
26 Feb

1979
1986
1976
1977
1962
1972
1965
1959
1959
1966
1967
1960
1960
1975
1964
1970
1983
1982

Declarationsand Reservations
ALGERIA
Declaration:
Referring to the possibility offered by article I, paragraph 3,
of the Convention, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
declares that it will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made only in the territory of another Contracting State and only
where such awards have been made with respect to differences
arising out of legal relationships whether contractual or not,
which are considered as commercial under Algerian law.
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Declarations:
"In accordance with article I, the Government of Antigua
and Barbuda declares that it will apply the Convention on the
basis of reciprocity only to the recognition and enforcement of
awards made in the territory of another contracting state.
The government of Antigua and Barbuda also declares that
it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of
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legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the laws of Antigua and Barbuda."

ARGENTINA
Upon signature:

Subject to the declaration contained in the Final Act.
Upon ratification:

On the basis of reciprocity, the Republic of Argentina will
apply the Convention only to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards made in the territory of the other Contracting State. It will also apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or
not, which are considered as commercial under its national law.
The Convention will be interpreted in accordance with the
principles and clauses of the National Constitution in Force or
those resulting from modification made by virtue of the
Constitution.
AUSTRIA
BAHRAIN
"1. The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 1958 shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or
be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind
therewith.
2. In accordance with article 1(3) of the Convention, the
State of Bahrain will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards
made in the territory of another Contracting State party to the

Convention.
3. In accordance with article 1(3) of the Convention, the
State of Bahrain will apply the Convention only to differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not,
which are considered as commercial under the national law of
the State of Bahrain."
BELGIUM
In accordance with article I, paragraph 3, the Government
of the Kingdom of Belgium declares that it will apply the Con-
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vention to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made only in the territory of a Contracting State.
BOTSWANA
"The Republic of Botswana will apply the Convention only
to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered commercial under Botswana
law.
"The Republic of Botswana will apply the Convention to
the Recognition and Enforcement of Awards made in the territory of another Contracting State."
BULGARIA
"Bulgaria will apply the Convention to recognition and
enforcement of awards made in the territory of another contracting State. With regard to awards made in the territory of
non-contracting States it will apply the Convention only to the
extent to which these States grant reciprocal treatment."
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic will apply the
provisions of this Convention in respect to arbitral awards made
in the territories of non-contracting States only to the extent to
which they grant reciprocal treatment.
CANADA
"The government of Canada declares that it will apply the
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships,
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial
under the laws of Canada, except in the case of the Province of
Quebec where the law does not provide for such limitation."
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Referring to the possibility offered by paragraph 3 of article
I of the Convention, the Central African Republic declares that
it will apply the Convention on the basis of reciprocity, to the
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another contracting State; it further declares that it will
apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relatiofiships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as
commercial under its national law.
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CHINA
1. The People's Republic of China will apply the Convention, only on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of another
Contracting State;
2. The People's Republic of China will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered commercial under the
national law of the People's Republic of China.
CUBA
"Cuba will apply the Convention to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of another
Contracting State. With respect to arbitral awards made by
other non-contracting States it will apply the Convention only in
so far as those States grant reciprocal treatment as established by
mutual agreement between the parties. Moreover, it will apply
the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered commercial under Cuban legislation."
CYPRUS
"The Republic of Cyprus will apply the Convention, on the
basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of
awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State;
furthermore it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which
are considered as commercial under its national law."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
"Czechoslovakia will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another
Contracting State. With regard to awards made in the territory
of non-contracting States it will apply the Convention only to
the extent to which these States grant reciprocal treatment."
DENMARK
In accordance with the terms of article I, paragraph 3, [the
Convention] shall have effect only as regards the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made by another Contracting
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State and [it] shall be valid only with respect to commercial
relationships.
ECUADOR
Ecuador, on a basis of reciprocity, will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made
in the territory of another contracting State only if such awards
have been made with respect to differences arising out of legal
relationships which are regarded as commercial under Ecuadorian law.
FRANCE
Referring to the possibility offered by paragraph 3 of article
I of the Convention, France declares that it will apply the Convention on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
contracting State.
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
"With respect to paragraph 1 of article I, and in accordance
with paragraph 3 of article I of the Convention, the Federal
Republic of Germany will apply the Convention only to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of
another Contracting State."
GREECE
18 April 1980
The present Convention is approved on condition of the
two limitations set forth in article 1(3) of the Convention.
GUATEMALA
On the basis of reciprocity, the Republic of Guatemala will
apply the above Convention to the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards made only in the territory of another contracting State; and will apply it only to differences arising out of
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under its national law.
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HOLY SEE
The State of Vatican City will apply the said Convention on
the basis of reciprocity, on the one hand, to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State, and on the other hand, only to differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not,
which are considered as commercial under Vatican law.
HUNGARY
"The Hungarian People's Republic shall apply the Convention to the Recognition and enforcement of such awards only as
have been made in the territory of one of the other Contracting
States and are dealing with differences arising in respect of a
legal relationship considered by the Hungarian law as a commercial relationship."
INDIA
In accordance with Article I of the Convention, the Government of India declare that they will apply the Convention to
the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of a State, party to this Convention. They further declare
that they will apply the Convention only to differences arising
out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are
considered as commercial under the law of India.
INDONESIA
"Pursuant to the provision of article 1(3) of the Convention,
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia declares that it
will apply the Convention on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory
of another Contracting State, and that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under
the Indonesian Law."
IRELAND
"In accordance with article 1(3) of the said Convention the
Government of Ireland declares that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made
only in the territory of another Contracting State."
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JAPAN
"It will apply the Convention to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State."
JORDAN
The government of Jordan shall not be bound by any
awards which are made by Israel or to which an Israeli is a
party.
KENYA
Declarations:
"In accordance with article 1(3) of the said Convention the
Government of Kenya declares that it will apply the Convention
to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made only
in the territory of another contracting state."
KUWAIT
The State of Kuwait will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of
another Contracting State.
It is understood that the accession of the State of Kuwait to
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, done at New York, on the 10th of June 1958,
does not mean in any way recognition of Israel or entering with
it into relations governed by the Convention thereto acceded by
the State of Kuwait.
LUXEMBOURG
Declaration
The Convention is applied on the basis of reciprocity to the
recognition and enforcement of only those arbitral awards made
in the territory of another Contracting State.
MADAGASCAR
The Malagasy Republic declares that it will apply the Convention on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
contracting State; it further declares that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships,
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whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial
under its national law.
MALAYSIA
Declaration
The Government of Malaysia will apply the Convention on
the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of
awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State.
Malaysia further declares that it will apply the Convention only
to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under Malaysian law.
MONACO
Referring to the possibility offered by article 1(3) of the
Convention, the Principality of Monaco will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another contracting
State; furthermore, it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or
not, which are considered under its national law.
MOROCCO
The Government of His Majesty the King of Morocco will
apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of
awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State.
NETHERLANDS
Referring to paragraph 3 of article I of the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
the Government of the Kingdom declares that it will apply the
Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made
only in the territory of another Contracting State.
NEW ZEALAND
Declarations
"In accordance with paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Convention, the Government of New Zealand declares that it will apply
the convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition
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and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State."
"Accession to the Convention by the Government of New
Zealand shall not extend for the time being, pursuant to article
X of the Convention, to the Cook Islands and Niue."
NIGERIA
"In accordance with paragraph 3 of article I of the Convention, the Federal Military Government of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria declares that it will apply the Convention on the basis
of reciprocity to the recognition and enforcement of awards
made only in the territory of a State party to this Convention
and to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria."
NORWAY
"1. [The Government of Norway] will apply the Convention only to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in
the territory of one of the Contracting States."
"2. [The Government of Norway] will apply the Convention to differences where the subject matter of the proceedings is
immovable property situated in Norway, or a right in or to such
property."
PHILIPPINES
Upon signature:
Reservation
"The Philippine delegation signs ad referendum this Convention with the reservation that it does so on the basis of
reciprocity.
Declaration
The Philippines will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of
another contracting State pursuant to Article I, paragraph 3 of
the Convention."
Declaration made upon ratification
"The Philippines, on the basis of reciprocity, will apply the
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Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made
only in the territory of another Contracting State and only to
differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual
or not, which are considered as commercial under the national
law of the State making sich declaration."
POLAND
"With reservations as mentioned in article I. para. 3."
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
"By virtue of paragraph 3 of article I of the present Convention, the Government of the Republic of Korea declares that
it will apply the convention to the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It further declares that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under
its national law.
ROMANIA
The Romanian People's Republic will apply the Convention
only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under
its legislation.
The Romanian People's Republic will apply the Convention
to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another Contracting State. As regards awards made in
the territory of certain non-contracting States, the Romanian
People's Republic will apply the Convention only on the basis of
reciprocity established by joint agreement between the parties.
SINGAPORE
"The Republic of Singapore will on the basis of reciprocity
apply the said Convention to the recognition and enforcement of
only those awards which are made in the territory of another
Contracting State."
SWITZERLAND
Referring to the possibility offered by paragraph 3 of article
I, Switzerland will apply the convention to the recognition and
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enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State.
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
"Inaccordance with article I of the Convention, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago declares that itwill apply the
convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made
only inthe territory of another Contracting State. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago further declares that itwill apply
the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the Law of Trinidad and Tobago."
TUNISIA
With the reservations provided for inarticle I,paragraph 3,
of the Convention, that.isto say, the Tunisian State will apply
the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards
made only inthe territory of another Contracting State and only
to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the Tunisian law.
UKRANIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
The Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic will apply the provisions of this Convention inrespect to arbitral awards made in
the territories of non-contracting States only to the extent to
which they grant reciprocal treatment.
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will apply the provisions of this Convention inrespect to arbitral awards made in
the territories of non-contracting States only to the extent to
which they grant reciprocal treatment.
UNITED KINGDOM
5 May 1980
"The United Kingdom will apply the Convention only to
the recognition and enforcement of awards made inthe territory
of another Contracting State. This declaration isalso made on
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behalf of Gibraltar, Hong Kong and the Isle of Man to which
the Convention has been extended."
19 April 1985
"In accordance with article X(2) of the Convention... the
Government of the United Kingdom [has decided to] extend the
said Convention to Guernsey. The Convention will be applied in
respect of Guernsey, in accordance with article I paragraph 3
thereof, only to the recognition and enforcement of awards made
in the territory of another Contracting State."
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
"The Government of the United Republic of Tanganyika
and Zanzibar will apply the Convention, in accordance with the
first sentence of article 1(3) thereof, only to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made in the territory of another Contracting State."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
"The United States of America will apply the Convention,
on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of
only those awards made in the territory of another Contracting
State.
"The United States of America will apply the Convention
only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under
the national law of the United States."
YUGOSLAVIA
Reservation
"1. The Convention is applied in regard to the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia only to those arbitral awards
which were adopted after the coming of the Convention into
effect.
2. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will apply
the Convention on a reciprocal basis only to those arbitral
awards which were adopted on the territory of the other State
Party to the Convention.
3. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will apply
the Convention [only] with respect to the disputes arising from
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the legal relations, contractual and non-contractual, which,
according to its national legislation are considered as economic."
Objections
(Unless otherwise indicated, the objections were received upon
ratification, accession or succession.)
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TerritorialApplication
Date of Receipt of
the Notification

Participant
Australia

26 Mar 1976

Papua
Denmark

10 Feb 1976

France

26 Jun 1959

Netherlands

24 Apr 1964

United Kingdom

24 Sep
21 Jan
22 Feb
14 Nov
26 Nov

United States of America

1975
1977
1979
1979
1980

3 Nov 1970

Territories
All the external
territories for the
international
relations of
which Australia
is responsible
other than
New Guinea
Faeroe Islands,
Greenland
All the territories
of the French
Republic
Netherlands,
Antilles, Surinam
Gibraltar
Hong Kong
Isle of Man
Bermuda
Belize, Cayman
Islands Guernsey
All the territories
for the
international
relations of
which the United
States of
America is
responsible

Declarationsand Reservation made on notification of
TerritorialApplication
UNITED KINGDOM
Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Guernsey
"[The Convention will apply] in accordance with article I,
paragraph 3 thereof, only to the recognition and enforcement of
awards made in the territory of another contracting State."
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II

1958 New York Arbitration Convention
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if
that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article Il
were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity,
or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decision on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties,
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of the country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.
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[Note: Although the English text of Article V(1) is permissive
('may be refused"), the equally authoritative French version
appears to be mandatory in that it provides, "Recognition and
execution of the award will not be refused... unless... [one of
the defenses is proved]": "La reconnaissance et 1'execution de la
sentence ne seront refusees... que si .... "]

